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Iris Murdoch and Common Sense 
Or, What Is It Like To Be A Woman In Philosophy 
Hannah Marije Altorf, St. Mary’s University 
On whether their originality had anything to do with gender, I cannot make a 
final judgment, but I suspect that women are less prone to jump on to 
bandwagons than at least some of their male colleagues and are also more 
reluctant to abandon common sense …  1
Abstract 
Philosophy is one of the least inclusive disciplines in the humanities and this situation is 
changing only very slowly. In this article I consider how one of the women of the Wartime 
Quartet, Iris Murdoch, can help to challenge this situation. Taking my cue from feminist and 
philosophical practices, I focus on Murdoch’s experience of being a woman and a 
philosopher and on the role experience plays in her philosophical writing. I argue that her 
thinking is best characterised with the notion of common sense or sensus communis. This 
term recognises her understanding of philosophy as based in experience and as a shared 
effort ‘to make sense of our life’, as Mary Midgley puts it.  
1. Introduction 
One of the difficulties that women in philosophy face is not being taken seriously as an 
interlocutor. It is not just that, as in the well-known cartoon, their ‘excellent suggestion’ need 
to made by ‘one of the men’ before it enters the debate. It is also that their work may not be 
recognised as philosophy at all. As Kristie Dotson puts it:  
It is not unreasonable to expect, in a field that has been dominated by a rather 
monochromatic population, that the inclusion of diverse people will also introduce 
wider possibilities for philosophical engagement or, at the very least, demand greater 
recognition for the existing diversity of methods available for philosophical 
engagement. Too often, people who voice skepticism about canonical questions and 
methods find they face a recurrent question: “How is you project ‘philosophy’?”  2
As Dotson explains, asking the question ‘How is this philosophy?’ indiscriminately is 
damaging because it risks the exclusion of diverse people and their thinking.   3
The work of Iris Murdoch offers an illuminating case study of this phenomenon, because of 
the significant shift in its reception. The question how her work is philosophy is now much 
less prominent that it was at the beginning of this century. I was then a PhD student at the 
University of Glasgow, writing my thesis on Murdoch’s understanding of imagination. 
Murdoch had died one year before I started my doctoral work. There was a growing interest 
 Mary Warnock on Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and Murdoch in A Memoir: People and Places (Duckbacks, 1
2002) p. 37.
 Kirstie Dotson, ‘Concrete Flowers: Contemplating the Profession of Philosophy’. Hypatia 26.2 (spring 2011), 2
403-409, p. 406. The cartoon I am referring to can be found here: https://punch.photoshelter.com/image/
I0000eHEXGJ_wImQ.
 Dotson, ‘Concrete Flowers’, p. 407. Dotson speaks of diverse people and her concern is with black women in 3
particular. I do not want to suggest that the problems facing different women are identical, but the question 
whether their work is philosophy is not limited to one group. As I will show, it has been asked of Iris Murdoch’s 
work. 
 1
in her life, but very few philosophers in the UK concerned themselves with her work. Most 
publications were by literary scholars and theologians or by philosophers from across the 
ocean.  This lack of interest in Murdoch’s philosophical work confirmed what I was often told 4
informally: philosophers in the United Kingdom seemed to think that Murdoch’s philosophy 
was, as A.N. Wilson put it in his memoirs, ‘[not] really philosophy at all’.  5
Since then much has changed. From 2002 onwards, there have been biennial Murdoch 
conferences, with increasing number of philosophy papers. Even more recently, interest in 
Murdoch’s work has been generated as part of the wider focus on the work of the wartime 
quartet: Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley and Murdoch. This recent 
development should be largely credited to the work of especially Rachael Wiseman and 
Clare Mac Cumhaill from (In Parenthesis).  That this project has taken off so well is evidence 6
of the talents of these philosophers, their creativity, their hard work and their openness to 
collaboration. 
In this article I engage closely with some aspects of (In Parenthesis). Specifically, I ask to 
what extend Murdoch can provide insight into the still marginal place of women in 
philosophy. My argument consists of three parts. In the first section I provide an outline of the 
project (In Parenthesis). I consider different suggestions for making philosophy more 
inclusive and I also argue why diversity in philosophy is important. In the next section I look 
at Murdoch’s experience of being a woman in philosophy and the reception of her work 
immediately after her death. In the last section, I consider to what extend her work offers an 
alternative philosophical method. 
To engage closely with (In Parenthesis) seems to me the best way to commend this project, 
though I should add that my approach and some of my interests are also different from 
Wiseman and Mac Cumhaill. I am not an analytical philosopher and I do not classify 
Murdoch as an analytical thinker either.  For one, her first book was on Jean-Paul Sartre and 7
her last unfinished publication on Martin Heidegger. For another, her writing is evidence of a 
 The pioneering work of Maria Antonaccio must be mentioned here, both her monograph (Picturing the 4
Human: The Moral Thought of Iris Murdoch, Oxford University Press, 2000) and the collection of essays, which 
she edited with William Schweiker and which included the work of such prominent thinkers as Charles Taylor, 
Martha Nussbaum and Cora Diamond amongst others (Iris Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness, 
Chicago University Press, 1996). The most comprehensive study by a British thinker of her philosophical work 
which included Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals from around the same time is the chapter by Fergus Kerr 
(Immortal Longings: Versions of Transcending Humanity, S.P.C.K. Publishing, 1997). There have been various 
introductions and studies of her novels of course, but their focus is obviously not the philosophical writing.
 A.N. Wilson, Iris Murdoch as I Knew Her (London: Hutchinson, 2003), p. 28. The rather defensive tone taken 5
by consequent writings, arguing that Murdoch was indeed a serious philosopher, is further evidence to the 
initial disregard for her work. In the introduction to the 2012 collection of essays Iris Murdoch, Philosopher 
(which includes only two essays by philosophers working at British universities) Justin Broackes’s writes: ‘There 
are people who suspect now, I think, that Murdoch was either not quite a serious and substantial philosopher or 
not quite a professional, recognized by her fellows.’ ((Oxford University Press) p. 6). See also my reflections on 
Murdoch as a serious philosopher: ‘‘Iris Murdoch, or What It Means To Be A Serious Philosopher’, Daimoon: 
Revista Internacional de Filosofía 60 (2013), pp. 75-91.
 Of course, they are not the only ones working on the quartet. See here especially the work of Benjamin 6
Lipscomb. For more information on In Parenthesis, see: http://www.womeninparenthesis.co.uk/.
 The distinction between analytical and continental philosophy and the notion of continent philosophy are not 7
without their difficulties. See Simon Critchley, Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 1-2 and throughout.
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very broad interest in thinkers and thoughts. As I hope to argue, philosophy needs this kind of 
diversity.  
2. In Parenthesis and Women in Philosophy  
(In Parenthesis) presents itself as first and foremost a historical project. It endeavours to 
rewrite the history of analytical philosophy to include Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and 
Murdoch as a school with its own method.  Yet, by studying the lives and works of these four 8
philosophers Mac Cumhaill and Wiseman are also looking for insight into ‘barriers to 
inclusion’ and intend ’to discover unknown factors and ultimately new strategies for gender 
activism within philosophy.’   9
(In Parenthesis) is then also a feminist project, if by feminism we mean any concerted effort 
to create equality between the genders. Of course, there are many feminisms, if only because 
it is not easy to decide what equality means. (To give a simple example with nevertheless 
significant consequences: to provide an equal number of toilets for men and women leaves 
women with a much longer waiting time than men. ) Yet, if (In Parenthesis) is a feminist 10
project, it is remarkable how little it uses the word ‘feminism’. It was not used in any of the 
descriptions of the 2018-2019 lectures series of the Royal Institute of Philosophy (and that 
includes mine). It is rarely used in its publications.  
On the website of (In Parenthesis), most hits for feminism are found in the wonderful lecture 
by professor Pamela Sue Anderson, entitled ‘Silencing and Speaker Vulnerability’.  I should 11
say the late professor Anderson, who could tell us much about barriers against inclusivity and 
strategies for inclusion and who was a great inspiration and support for many young 
philosophers. To find the word feminism in the writing of Wiseman and Mac Cumhaill I had 
to go to the latest edition of The Iris Murdoch Review, when they explain their strategy as 
follows:  
To be defined as a school is to be recognised by one’s community as serious 
interlocutors. This is a reminder about how we should approach the history of 
philosophy: if a set of voices are deemed by their peers to be irrelevant, 
uninteresting, unworthy, they may not be recognised by those peers as articulating 
a distinctive philosophical perspective, worthy of recognition as such. To recover 
those voices then, is to rewrite history - a feminist project, the social and political 
importance of which is plain.  12
 Clare MacCumhaill and Rachael Wiseman, ’A Female School of Analytic Philosophy?: Anscombe, Foot, 8
Midgley and Murdoch’ [http://www.womeninparenthesis.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/PENN-trip-blog-
post-script-1.pdf]
 See ‘About’ [http://www.womeninparenthesis.co.uk/about/]. Those insights and strategies are unfortunately 9
needed in a discipline that still has surprising few women in top positions and that has been shocked by some 
very public cases of sexual harassment.
 See for instance https://americanrestroom.org/potty-parity/.10
 Pamela Sue Anderson, ‘Silencing and Speaker Vulnerability: Undoing an Oppressive Form of (Wilful) 11
Ignorance’. [http://www.womeninparenthesis.co.uk/silencing-and-speaker-vulnerability-undoing-an-oppressive-
form-of-wilful-ignorance/]
 Clare Mac Cumhaill and Rachael Wiseman, ‘Anscombe, Foot, Midgley, Murdoch: A Philosophical 12
School’ (The Iris Murdoch Review, 2018, pp. 39-49), p. 47.
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This quotation gives insight into (In Parenthesis)’s understanding of feminism. Firstly, it 
emphasises the importance of recognition as a serious interlocutor and secondly, it omits the 
the word ‘philosophical’ from its last line. Rewriting history has social and political 
importance, but not philosophical? I shall come back to both these points. 
Even though the project is only a few years old, it has already provided a number of 
explanations for these four women’s remarkable achievements. The first came in the 
exchange that was at the start of the project. In his column in The Guardian in November 
2013 Jonathan Wolff had been musing about the exclusive nature of philosophy. He revisits 
his copy of Mary Warnock’s memoirs and asks: ‘What was it that produced such a superb 
cohort of female philosophers, unmatched, I think, by anything we have seen since?’   13
Midgley replied two days later: ‘As a survivor from the wartime group, I can only say: sorry, 
but the reason was indeed that there were fewer men about then.’ Men are not the problem 
as such, but a certain style of doing philosophy is, as Midgley, tongue in cheek, suggests:  
It was clear that we were all more interested in understanding this deeply 
puzzling world than in putting each other down. That was how Elizabeth 
Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Iris Murdoch, Mary Warnock and I, in our various 
ways, all came to think out alternatives to the brash, unreal style of 
philosophising – based essentially on logical positivism – that was current at 
the time.  14
An editor gave Midgley’s reply the title ‘The Golden Age of Female Philosophy’. This title is 
troubling for different reasons. Firstly, as Midgley points out in one of the interviews by (In 
Parenthesis): ‘Four of us don’t make a Golden Age.’  Secondly, highlighting these women 15
can make others even more invisible. Wolff’s suggestion that he has not seen anything like 
this since seems to reinforce the difficulty that women and diverse people can face in being 
recognised as ‘knowers’, a difficulty mentioned by him in the same column and discussed at 
length by Anderson.   16
This column and its responses, together with the memoirs by Mary Warnock (People and 
Places, 2000) and Midgley (The Owl of Minerva, 2005) have added to this first exchange to 
create an amalgam of explanations. Midgley points out that it mattered that there were fewer 
men around because of the war. Classes were smaller and the discussions less combative. 
This gave the women the space and time to find their voice. The women were also 
encouraged by their teacher, Donald MacKinnon. They were all middle class. They got 
 Jonathan Wolff, ‘How can we end the male domination of philosophy?’ (The Guardian 26 November 2013 13
[https://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/nov/26/modern-philosophy-sexism-needs-more-women]. See 
also ‘About’ [https://www.womeninparenthesis.co.uk/about/.] 
 Midgley, ‘The Golden Age of Female Philosophy’ (The Guardian 26 November 2013 [https://14
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/28/golden-age-female-philosophy-mary-midgley.]
 See Midgley, ‘Four of us don’t make a golden age’. Video available at http://www.womeninparenthesis.co.uk/15
mary-midgley-16/. 
 The adjective ‘Female’ in ‘The Golden Age of Female Philosophy’ creates additional difficulties. Does it mean 16
philosophy by women or philosophy practised in a female way? The difficulty becomes even more obvious 
when contrasting ‘female philosophy’ to ‘male philosophy’. 
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together to discuss their shared despair at the moral philosophy of their time. (As Midgley 
puts it: ’We got quite indignant about that!’ ) 17
Some of these insights return in the website’s enthusiastic suggestion to ‘host a cocoa party’ 
or start a reading group. One could think of others: a reevaluation of teaching at university, 
for instance, which - at least in Britain - has lost its prestige to research. A teacher like 
MacKinnon might not have been able to find or retain a position at a UK institution today.  18
The excellent report ‘Women in Philosophy’ by Jennifer Saul and Helen Beebee for SWIP/
BPA (2011) should also be mentioned here and its recommendations for challenging implicit 
bias and stereotype threat and the inclusion of women in one’s syllabi and conferences.  19
Yet, what I find missing, is a more direct challenge to philosophy’s method, goals or to the 
questions it asks. Thus, in the next sections, I intend to heed to Dotson’s call for ‘alternative 
methods of philosophical investigation’.  I do so by by asking ’what is it like to be a woman 20
in philosophy?’ when it comes to Murdoch. This question is of course a direct reference to 
the website ‘What is it like to be a woman in philosophy?’.  It asks about personal 21
experience and partakes in feminist practice which takes personal experience seriously, that 
is telling stories and listening to voices that would otherwise go unheard. This practice is an 
important tool in challenging power relations. Yet, as Linda Martín Alcoff explains, women 
philosophers have been surprisingly reluctant to share their experiences.  22
The reluctance to take experience seriously is also surprising when considering that in the 
field of philosophy there is an additional reason to take experience seriously. This is Socrates’ 
famous phrase ‘The unexamined life is not worth living’ (Apology 38a). I mention this here 
for two reasons. First, all philosophy which is not a direct reflection on experience is a 
departure from this famous dictum. Secondly, for the last ten years or so, I have been inspired 
to think of alternative methods for doing philosophy as a participant and facilitator of 
Socratic dialogues in the Nelson-Heckmann-Specht tradition. Dialogues in this tradition are 
best described as philosophical investigations of experience undertaken together.  They offer 23
a way of doing philosophy which is very different from much of what I have encountered in 
 Midgley, ‘We got quite indignant about that!’. [http://www.womeninparenthesis.co.uk/mary-midgley-15/].17
 Cp. Stefan Collini, ‘Browne’s Gamble’: ‘The devoted university teachers of a generation or more ago who 18
were widely read and kept up with recent scholarship, but who were not themselves prolific publishers, have in 
many cases been hounded into early retirement, to be replaced (if replaced at all) by younger colleagues who 
see research publications as the route to promotion and esteem, and who try to limit their commitment to 
undergraduate teaching as far as they can.’ (London Review of Books, vol 32.21 (4 November 2001), pp. 23-25. 
[https://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n21/stefan-collini/brownes-gamble]
 Helen Beebee and Jenny Saul, ‘Women in Philosophy in the UK’. [http://www.swipuk.org/notices/19
2011-09-08/Women%20in%20Philosophy%20in%20the%20UK%20%28BPA-SWIPUK%20Report%29.pdf]
 Cp. Dotson, ‘Concrete Flowers’, pp. 408, 403 and also ‘How Is This Paper Philosophy?’, Comparative 20
Philosophy 3.1 (2012), pp. 3-29 
 See https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com. This website makes for depressing reading, when 21
some of its greatest hits are ‘failure to take women seriously’ and ‘sexual harassment’. The site is actually aware 
of the fact that it may discourage women from entering the profession at all. 
 Linda Martín Alcoff, Singing in the Fire: Stories of Women in Philosophy (2003), pp. 4-5. This collection is an 22
important exception to the rule, containing the stories of twelve philosophers, all of whom are or have been 
employed by universities in the United States.
 For fuller description of and reflection on this method, see Hannah Marije Altorf, ‘Dialogue or Discussion’: 23
Reflections on a Socratic Method’, Arts and Humanities in Higher Education 18.1 (2019), pp. 60-75. In this 
article I comment too on the fact that the emphasis on experience is not always appreciated by the participants, 
especially philosophers.
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academic settings, because of the central role of experience and because the dialogue is a 
shared undertaking. Participants try to understand each other and come to a consensus (if 
possible). These dialogues allow participants to experience that combative forms of arguing 
are not necessarily the best means to truth. They can be detrimental to the philosophical 
investigation, especially but not exclusively when one discusses experience and thus makes 
oneself vulnerable.  24
Before I turn to the next section, however, a brief reflection on the question what it is to be a 
woman in philosophy. This may seem a trivial or elite pursuit, given the silencing of women 
in other situations that ask more urgently for voices to be heard. While this objection is not 
without its merit, it is also true that the exclusive nature of the discipline has resulted in an 
excluding understanding of who is and who is not capable of thought, which has had its 
repercussions beyond the discipline.   25
More importantly, the objection implies that philosophy is a luxury and I do not think it 
should be seen as such. I am for that reason concerned about the number of philosophy 
departments that are in the process of closing or have closed at universities around the 
country. In the last few years, London alone has seen the closure of philosophy departments 
at London Metropolitan, Middlesex University, Greenwich University, Heythrop College 
(which has closed altogether) and St. Mary’s University. This means that in London the 
opportunities for students with lower grades to study philosophy are dwindling fast. In the 
current British education system, students with lower grades are not necessarily academically 
less capable. They are often from a disadvantaged economical background. Philosophy thus 
runs the risk of becoming an elite subject again.  
It is of interest to note some of the similarities in the closure of these programmes here. One 
is the fact that these universities combined European and analytical approaches to 
philosophy, were often near the top in terms of student satisfaction and offered modules that 
allow students to take philosophy outside the university. (For instance, Philosophy with 
Children at Greenwich University and Heythrop College, Socratic dialogue at St. Mary’s 
University). Most significant is that the one degree that was saved was the MA in European 
Philosophy, which moved from Middlesex to Kingston. The deciding factor was the REF.    
Here one cannot but be reminded of Mary Midgley’s comments on the closure of philosophy 
in Newcastle in the 1980s. She writes in her latest work, What is philosophy for?:  
… it is surely the effort to examine our life as a whole, to make sense of it, to 
locate its big confusions and resolve its big conflicts, that has been the prime 
business of traditional philosophy. Only quite lately has a different pattern of 
 See also Helen Beebee, ‘Women and Deviance in Philosophy’, (Katrina Hutchinson and Fiona Jenkins (eds). 24
Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change (Oxford University Press, pp. 63-73) and Marilyn Friedman (op. 
cit., pp. 39-60). See especially p. 28: ‘This constant responsiveness to objections and criticism, integrated into 
the very nature and presentation of philosophical work, may promote an atmosphere in which philosophers 
tend to avoid investing themselves too deeply in their philosophical positions lest they have to give those up at 
the next go-round. In this way, it is easy to regard philosophy as a game or contest rather than a genuine search 
for wisdom.’
 Cp. Michèle le Doeuff, Hipparchia’s Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, Etc. (Blackwell, 25
1991) pp. 5-6. 
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philosophizing caught on - a pattern that is modelled closely on the physical 
sciences and is reverently called Research.  26
The closure of those five philosophy departments confirms the judgment of research as the 
highest value. We are in a situation that is not that different from the one Mary Midgley 
describes. And yet, what if, philosophy is not a luxury, but, as Midgley would have it, a need 
for everyone?  27
3. What is it like to be a woman in philosophy?  
What is it like to be a woman in philosophy? When asked in interviews, Murdoch seemed 
reluctant to acknowledge any difference between being a man and being a woman in 
philosophy. Most famously, when asked in an interview with Sheila Hale in 1976 whether 
there was a contemporary woman she admired, she expressed her regard for Simone de 
Beauvoir, but also added: ‘… the subject bores me in a way. I have never felt picked out in an 
intellectual sense because I am a woman; these distinctions are not made at Oxford.’  28
Murdoch’s words here are an obvious echo of the famous opening lines of De Beauvoir’s The 
Second Sex (‘For a long time I have hesitated to write a book on woman. The subject is 
irritating, especially to women.’ ) Yet, unlike De Beauvoir Murdoch avoids the subject or 29
even warns against pursuing it.  What is it like to be a woman in philosophy? It is like being 30
a man in philosophy.  
These are curious claims, especially given the current debates about (the lack of) women in 
philosophy, which have not bypassed Oxford.  In March 2018 its Faculty of Philosophy 31
decided to ‘feminise’ its reading lists and to introduce the target of 40% female authors. This 
decision was reported on various news sites, but - as far as I have been able to determine - 
not on the website of Oxford University. On the news sites, the comments were largely 
critical. The following gives a good flavour: 
The reading list should include the best writers on the subject. If they are female 
or male should not matter.  32
This comment is based on a number of suppositions. It assumes that it is only worthwhile to 
read the best writers and that it is clear who is better and who is worse and not a matter of 
 Mary Midgley, What is Philosophy For? (Bloomsbury 2018), p. 11.26
 Mary Midgley, ‘Philosophical Plumbing’. Utopias, Dolphins and Computers (Routledge 1996), pp. 1-14. See 27
especially p. 14: ‘it might well pay us to be less interested in what philosophy can do for our dignity, and more 
aware of the shocking malfunctions for which it is an essential remedy.’
 Sheila Hale, ‘Interview from “Women Writers Now: Their Approach and Their Apprenticeship”’. (Gillian 28
Dooley (Ed.), From a Tiny Corner in the House of Fiction: Conversations with Iris Murdoch. University of South 
Carolina Press, 2003, p. 30-32. The quotation is from p. 32, italics added).
 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (Vintage, 1997, p. 13). Murdoch probably read the French text. The 29
phrase is similar in French.
 ‘I am not interested in the “woman’s world” or the assertion of a “female viewpoint”. This is often rather an 30
artificial idea and can in fact injure the promotion of rights. We want to join the human race, not invent a new 
separatism…” (Jack I. Biles, ‘An Interview with Iris Murdoch, (Dooley (ed.) op. cit., pp. 61-62.)
 See https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5503059/Oxford-University-feminise-philosophy-reading-31
lists.html; cp. https://www.oxfordstudent.com/2018/03/27/philosophy-at-oxford-too-many-men/.
 Lucas Cahal, comment on https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/2018/03/14/oxford-university-set-feminise-32
curriculum-requesting-inclusion/
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taste or tradition. Most importantly, it assumes that the reading lists now contain ‘the best 
writers’ and that some will need to go.  
This last suggestion is in a way confirmed by the then chair of the philosophy faculty, Edward 
Harcourt, when he explains the rationale for this change: ‘partly just because it’s interesting, 
and partly to raise the profile and status of feminist philosophy at Oxford’.  There is no 33
mention that there was anything wrong with the existing lists. It is, of course, interesting to 
include 40% women philosophers, as it interesting to, for instance, include one thinker from 
every century or to reintroduce some thinkers from the Medieval period, which seem to have 
disappeared from most departments. Yet, it would have been more honest and insightful to 
admit that any reading list can be improved and that philosophy is not as neutral as it is too 
often assumed to be.  It is significant that only the student newspaper invited experts in 34
feminist philosophy to respond to the initiative. Both professors Mari Mikkola (Oxford) and 
Jennifer Saul (Sheffield) argue against an understanding of philosophy as ‘value-free’ or about 
‘timeless truths’.  This raises the question of what these values are, or whose. 35
I discuss this example here, because some of these assumptions seem to underlie Murdoch’s 
replies in interviews. Most importantly, Murdoch assumes philosophy is gender neutral. This 
is a curious suggestion, given that in her writing Murdoch is keenly aware of ‘would-be 
neutral philosophers [who] merely take sides surreptitiously’.  That she does not extend this 36
insight to gender suggests a more general reluctance to consider gender in philosophy. It 
should also be noted that Murdoch’s comments there are not the full story. Firstly, Murdoch’s 
words in interviews are not a comprehensive account of her position. Murdoch gave more 
than 175 interviews between 1955 and 1996. These are at times illuminating and at other 
times baffling. Murdoch sometimes provides wonderful insight into her work and her life and 
at other times her words seem at odds with her writing practice.   37
Secondly and more importantly, Murdoch was well aware of gender distinctions and 
discrimination. From Peter Conradi’s bibliography we learn that on arrival in Oxford 
Murdoch was warned by the Dean of Somerville that ‘women are still very much on 
probation in this University’’.  Conradi also notes that she perceived herself ‘as a mixture of 38
the revolutionary Rosa Luxembourg, the philosopher Susan Stebbing and the feminist writer 
Simone De Beauvoir,’’ and was advised by her MacKinnon never to repeat that to anyone.  39
The most immediate example comes from an interview with Sir Harold Hobson in 1962, 
which took place in the Ladies section of the Union Club. In this interview Murdoch points 
out the sexism and prejudice of the interviewer to which he subjects her in the actual 
 See https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5503059/Oxford-University-feminise-philosophy-reading-33
lists.html.
 Cp. Dotson, ‘Concrete Flowers’, p. 407. 34
 Cherwell, the Oxford University student newspaper, 13 March 2018 [https://cherwell.org/2018/03/13/35
undergrad-paper-in-feminist-philosophy-to-be-introduced/.]
 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (Vintage, 2001), p. 76. 36
 See Marije Altorf, Iris Murdoch and the Art of Imagining (Continuum, 2008) pp. 2-6.37
  Peter Conradi, Iris Murdoch: A Life. (HarperCollinsPublishers, 2001) p. 82, quoting Fera Varnell, the Dean of 38
Somerville. See also Marije Altorf, ‘After Cursing the Library: Iris Murdoch and the (In)visibility of Women in 
Philosophy’. Hypatia 26-2 (2011), pp. 384-402. In this article I offer a critical reading of the three biographies/
memoirs that were published shortly after Murdoch’s death in 1999 (the memoirs by her husband John Bayley, 
the biography by Peter Conradi and A.N. Wilson).
 Conradi op. cit., p. 256. 39
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conservation. He first suggests it is all a joke, but when pressed he is not so sure. (I used this 
example in an earlier article and am surprised how little it has been noted and discussed. ) 40
It is clear that Murdoch experienced sexism, which should not come as a surprise. She was 
also able to recognise and name it as such, but she did not discuss, let alone write about, her 
experience of being a woman and a philosopher. Perhaps MacKinnon’s advice stopped her 
from ever bringing it up again. There is, of course, no obligation to speak of one’s experience, 
including one’s experience of being a woman. The subject is ‘boring’ and ‘irritating’. This was 
true in 1948, it was true in 1962 and, I would argue, is still true today. Any space that 
promises to take us out of that messiness has to be welcomed and philosophy still promises 
to be such a space.  Yet, it does not follow that Murdoch was not affected by being a 41
woman. This is poignantly obvious when considering the first years after her death.  
In the early 2000s Murdoch, philosopher and novelist, was even more famous for a third 
reason: for suffering from Alzheimer’s disease at the end of her life and for having a lot of sex 
with different people when she was young. In those years people would mention the film first 
when I told them I was working on Iris Murdoch. This film, Iris (2001), is a moving portrait of 
someone who cares about a spouse with Alzheimer. Yet, even though there is ample talk 
about Murdoch’s work and how wonderful it is, the film contains hardly any of her words or 
ideas. I counted one slightly adopted line from Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals and one 
quotation from the letter by Paul to the Philippians, with which Murdoch ends Metaphysics 
as a Guide to Morals.  What is it like to be a woman in philosophy? Is it to be remembered 42
for someone other than your thoughts? Not to be given your own voice? 
In addition to the difficulties noted above, Murdoch’s oeuvre adds more complication. 
Murdoch was and probably is better known as a novelist. This creates the difficulty of her 
oeuvre. How do the two genres relate? Can we read the one without the other? Can we even 
make a distinction between the two? It may be possible that the novels allowed Murdoch a 
financial and intellectual independence, yet the growing distance to academic philosophy 
seems also to have troubled her. In interviews Murdoch was reluctant to call herself a 
philosopher.  She shares this reluctance with two other great thinkers from the twentieth 43
century, De Beauvoir and Hannah Arendt, whose work - like Murdoch’s - is not easy to 
pigeonhole.  44
What is it like to be a woman in philosophy? It is to be annoyed with that question, it is be 
deeply aware of gender distinctions and bored by it, it is to have your first name as the title of 
a film that has only one sentence from your own writing in it and it is to confuse future 
scholars with the nature of your oeuvre. In short, there is no easy answer to the question, but 
 See Marije Altorf, ‘Reassessing Iris Murdoch in the Light of Feminist Philosophy: Michèle le Doeuff and the 40
Philosophical Imaginary.’ Anne Rowe (ed.), Iris Murdoch: A Reassessment (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp.
175-186.
 Cp. Le Doeuff, op. cit., pp.9-10. 41
 On rereading Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Penguin, 1993) recently, I recognised a short quotation from 42
p. 497 and of course the very last quote, p. 512.
 See the interview with M. Le Gros, quoted in Hilda Spear, Iris Murdoch (Palgrave, 2006), p. 9.43
 Especially Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (1992), her Gifford lectures from 1982, has puzzled readers 44
even since it was first published. For a wonderful collection of illuminating articles in the work, see Nora 
Hämäläinen, Gillian Doolley (eds.), Reading Iris Murdoch’s Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2019).
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ignoring it may result in not seeing how some gender stereotypes have moved us away from 
Murdoch’s work or to overlook its attempt at inclusivity. I discuss this last aspect in the next 
section.  
4. Common sense - sensus communis 
Murdoch may have denied the existence of gender distinctions in Oxford, but - like other 
members of the quartet - she was aware of the divergence between her philosophical 
thinking and that encountered in Oxford. In this section I argue that her work offers an 
alternative philosophical method, which I characterise as common sense, or sensus 
communis. In this section I thus engage again more directly with the project of (In 
Parenthesis), in particular their characterisation of the Quartet’s attitude as ‘uncommon sense 
realism’. 
In almost all her writing Murdoch is concerned with not just arguments, but also the form 
which arguments take or should take.  The three essays in The Sovereignty of Good provide 45
insightful examples here. In the first, ’The Idea of Perfection’, Murdoch proclaims that ‘[t]here 
is a two-way movement in philosophy, a movement towards the building of elaborate 
theories, and a move back again towards the consideration of simple and obvious facts.’  46
She announces that she will attempt a ‘movement of return’. The second essay, ‘On “God” 
and “Good”’ begins with the provoking sentence: ‘To do philosophy is to explore one’s own 
temperament, and yet at the same time to attempt to discover the truth.’  The third essay, 47
‘The Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts’, takes issue with the disregard for metaphors 
held ‘by many contemporary thinkers’.  48
I am in particular interested in the return to simple and obvious facts, for this is a returning 
trope especially in Murdoch’s earlier writing. Murdoch often distances herself from the 
dominant philosophical argumentation and takes the position of an outsider, siding with the 
ordinary, the ‘simple’ and ‘obvious’, with ‘us,’ ‘when we are not philosophising’ . She also 49
introduces outsiders to the philosophical debate: the virtuous peasants,‘some quiet 
unpretentious worker, a schoolteacher, or a mother, or better still an aunt.’  She lets an 50
argument be interrupted by ‘people [who] may begin to protest and cry out and say that 
something has been taken from them.’  51
This trope of the virtuous peasant has been criticised for being literary fiction more than 
actual person and Murdoch has been accused of living in an ivory tower.  Murdoch seems 52
aware of this criticism when she exclaims in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals: ‘I have 
 This aspect was recently brought to my attention again in a lecture by Mark Hopwood, Pardubice 8 June 45
2019. 
 Murdoch, Sovereignty of Good, p. 1.46
 Murdoch, op. cit., p. 47.47
 Murdoch, op. cit., p. 75.48
 Murdoch ‘Thinking and Language’, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature. Edited 49
and with a Preface by Peter Conradi. Foreword by George Steiner. (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997) pp. 33-42. 
The quotation is from p. 33. 
 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, p. 429.50
 Murdoch, Sovereignty of Good, p. 1351
 See Conradi, op. cit. p. 244. Cp. too Lyndsey Stonebridge, The Judicial Imagination: Writing after Nuremberg. 52
(Edinburgh University Press, 2011). 
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known such aunts’.  While the criticism is not without foundation, I don’t think it is 53
sufficient reason to dismiss these references. The voices are disruptive to Murdoch’s 
argument. Murdoch heeds to voices outside the academic debate, even when they are more 
like a cry and less like a fully fledged argument. These voices are thus proof of Murdoch’s 
attempt to make philosophy more inclusive, even if it is not as inclusive as her critics might 
like.  
This concern with the form of argument does not necessarily place Murdoch outside the 
tradition of philosophy. On the contrary, it can be understood in a long tradition of 
philosophers who marked a clear break with their predecessors (such as, for instance, René 
Descartes or A.J. Ayer). Yet, to do so would be to miss an opportunity to rethink the history 
and practices of philosophy. Alternative placing is suggested by the work of different feminist 
thinkers and most succinctly presented in the musings that conclude the first chapter of 
Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own. The narrator has talked of a visit to Oxbridge, where 
her thought is first interrupted when she is stopped from walking on the grass and next when 
she is barred from entering the library. She has had a copious lunch at a men’s college and a 
more frugal dinner at a women’s college and then on her way back to her room at the end of 
the day: ‘I pondered … what effect poverty has on the mind; and what effect wealth has on 
the mind; … I thought how unpleasant it is to be locked out; and I thought how it is worse 
perhaps to be locked in’.  Woolf cautions that being an outsider is not an entirely 54
undesirable condition, even if it is likely to be short on money. She thus makes us reflect on 
any attempt to move the outsider inside. 
In their ‘Women in the History of Philosophy’ lecture at the University of Sheffield in 2017, 
Wiseman and Mac Cumhaill characterise the four women’s stance as ‘uncommon sense 
realism’. They explain this term as follows: ‘The realistic spirit described involves a strong 
commitment to ‘common sense’, but not in the manner of linguistic philosophers like Hare 
and ‘ordinary language’ philosophers like Austin.’ Uncommon sense then, because of 
common sense’s possible association with Hare and Austin. Uncommon sense too, because 
of the realism of these women, taking a realistic attitude is ‘an uncommon achievement.’  55
I have wondered whether the term ‘uncommon sense’ has been inspired by the quotation at 
the start of my article. The quotation comes from Mary Warnock’s memoirs and I used them 
in an earlier text. Warnock reflects here on the exceptional generation who were her seniors 
by only a few years: 
On whether their originality had anything to do with gender, I cannot make a final 
judgment, but I suspect that women are less prone to jump on to bandwagons 
than at least some of their male colleagues and are also more reluctant to 
abandon common sense …  56
In an earlier text article I attributed probably more significance to these lines than Warnock 
allows for. I related it to the prominent trope of the outsider in Murdoch’s writing and I 
 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, p. 429. 53
 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1957), p. 24.54
 Mac Cumhaill and Wiseman, ‘A Female School of Academic Philosophy?’. 55
 Warnock, A Memoir: People and Places, p. 37.56
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argued that it was the literary tradition of Jane Austen, the Brontë sisters, Mrs Gaskill that 
allowed Murdoch her to take her position of an outsider in academic philosophy.     57
I agree that common sense is a difficult term for the reasons Wiseman and Mac Cumhaill 
mention and perhaps even more so because in our everyday conversations it has the 
connotation of exclusion. People are admonished for not showing any common sense rather 
than appraised for showing any. One is told off for having no common sense when cutting 
oneself, rather than praised for exhibiting plenty of common sense when preparing a meal 
without the need for plasters. Yet, despite these concerns, I would want to plead for the use of 
the term common sense - or perhaps the Latin sensus communis - to understand the 
achievements of these women and in particular of Murdoch. Sensus communis may 
challenge philosophical practice in a way that I am still exploring. What follows is a first 
indication of its promise. 
Common sense has - as far as I know - two distinct histories in philosophy. The traditions are 
probably not as separate as I present them here, but I have found no cross reference. The one 
history is that of  - roughly - Thomas Reid, G.E. Moore and others, who claim the certainty of 
self-evident truths. The assumption is that such truths are ‘no sooner understood than they are 
believed.’  They form the foundation of philosophical reflection. The other tradition is that of 58
Immanuel Kant and more recently, and for this article more importantly, Hannah Arendt. 
Common sense is here sensus communis.  Arendt understands this as the sixth sense and as 59
a sense that we share. While historically Murdoch is associated more with Moore than 
Arendt, I shall use Arendt’s rather than Moore’s understanding here.  60
Arendt understand common sense as a sense of what is in common. Common sense, she 
writes, ‘…assures us of the reality of the world and of ourselves.’  I know that the coffee in 61
my cup is real, because my different senses confirm this (it looks like coffee, it smells like 
coffee, it tastes like coffee and as much as that is possible it feels and sounds like coffee). I 
also know it is real because it is common to myself and others (the moment of drinking 
coffee is often a social event at a particular time of the day. Or to put it differently, no one is 
behaving as if there is no cup on the table or as if I am about to drink poison, etc.). In The 
Human Condition Arendt writes: ‘the presence of others, who see and hear what we see and 
hear assures us of the reality of the world and of ourselves.’   62
Common sense reassures us of reality. The notion thus understood reminds of the experiences 
of women and diverse people in philosophy, who feel excluded and also disconnected when 
 Altorf, ‘After Cursing the Library’.57
 Thomas Reid as quoted in Nichols, Ryan and Gidein Yaffe, ‘Thomas Reid’, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The 58
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition) [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/
reid/]. 
 Arendt uses different terms for common sense (common sense, Gesunder Menschenverstand, le bon sense, 59
sensus communis, Gemeinsinn). See Marieke Borren, ‘A Sense of the World: Hannah Arendt’s Hermeneutic 
Phenomenology of Common Sense’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21(2) (2013), pp. 22-255.
 There is, as far as I know, one short reference to Arendt in Murdoch’s writing. There are many conceptual 60
similarities, especially on imagination. (See also White 2014.)
 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (The University of Chicago Press, 1998),p. 50.  61
 Arendt op. cit., p. 50.  The English language has at least two expressions for this experience of losing one’s 62
sense of reality, because one is longer certain that others see the and hear what we see and hear: the elephant 
in the room and gaslighting.
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for instance the misogyny of a thinker is treated as a mere joke. In Arendt’s work common 
sense plays an important part in her understanding of totalitarianism. Common sense is 
vulnerable and can leave us. We see innocent people being led away and yet we can’t 
believe our eyes, especially when no one else seem to acknowledge the awful reality. 
If common sense is thus understood, the question remains whether common sense is taken as 
either a priori or a posteriori. Do we hold whatever it is as common sense by virtue of our 
humanity or whether it is acquired during our lives and perhaps specific to the community 
we are part of? Both these understandings can lead to exclusivity, either when one is denied 
one’s humanity or excluded from a community.  A way out of this problem is suggested by 63
Marieke Borren, who emphasises the phenomenological nature of Arendt’s writing: “As a 
phenomenologist, [Arendt] rejects the idea of human nature altogether and instead adopts 
the perspective of human conditions, which may or may not be realized, depending on other 
conditions and circumstances.”  64
Common sense or sensus communis is then something to be valued. The remedy to any 
frightening loss of common sense, and thus of reality, is, for Arendt, to talk about what we 
share with friends and by talking make them more common.  This conversation does not 65
mean all will agree, but only that something will become more common to all, that 
friendships are made stronger as well as our sense of reality. It seems to me that this 
characterises Murdoch’s dialogical philosophy as well as the conversations Anscombe, Foot, 
Midgley and Murdoch had. Philosophy - as most intellectual endeavours - can be and has 
been an alienating activity. That Murdoch was able to redeem some of the outsiders 
perspectives for philosophy may well be thanks to these conversations.  
If this understanding of philosophy as not abandoning common sense or sensus communis 
may not seem all that unusual, I would be glad. Of course, this kind of conversation is not 
alien to history of philosophy or to current philosophical practice. Yet, it may surprise those 
people who understand philosophy as a rigid pursuit of truth, as combat between 
adversaries, which may in its endeavour silence a diversity of voices.  What I hope to have 66
shown is that this silence is not just to the detriment of those voices, but also to the 
philosophy developed. Why else would we be celebrating the voices of the wartime quartet, 
if not for their profound contributions?  
5. Coda  
What is it like to be a woman in philosophy? I hope to have shown that there is not a simple 
answer to this question, not in general and not in the case of Murdoch. In one interview 
Murdoch claimed that in Oxford there was no difference: to be a woman in philosophy is to 
be a man in philosophy. Yet, there is also ample evidence that she was keenly aware of 
gender discrimination and that she understood philosophy as not value free. Gender also 
 Borren, op. cit., pp. 226-7. Borren argues that much of this debate is based around the question whether 63
Arendt’s Kant-lectures are exegesis or present her own thinking and position.
 Borren, op. cit., p. 247.64
 Hannah Arendt, ’Philosophy and Politics (Social Research 71.3 (2004), pp. 427-454), p. 434-435: ‘Friendship 65
to a large extent, indeed, consists of this kind of talking about something that the friends have in common. By 
talking about what is between them, it becomes ever more common to them.’
 See Dotson, ‘Concrete Flowers’ on the prominence of the adversarial method. 66
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affected her posthumous image for a while, when she was portrayed for the mind she lost 
rather than for the novels and works of philosophy that she wrote.  
Being a woman in philosophy runs the risk of not being taken seriously as an interlocutor. 
When those who divert from the dominant discourse are asked once too often that what they 
are doing is philosophy, it should not surprise that some of them decide to leave the 
profession. It is not obvious whose loss is greater, whether it is, as Woolf mused, better to be 
locked in or locked out, whether, as Dotson puts it, they have failed in philosophy or 
philosophy has failed them.  
Philosophy is slowly becoming a more inclusive discipline, thanks to a growing number of 
proposals and recommendations. I have argued that to become truly inclusive philosophy 
needs to rethink its methods, goals and the questions it asks. Dotson is right to argue that 
philosophy needs a plurality of methods. Inspired by Murdoch and the wartime quartet I have 
characterised one alternative as ‘not abandoning common sense’. This kind of philosophy is 
an shared investigation of experience. As a shared investigation it is markedly different from 
the adversarial method and its focus of experience allows us to confirm reality and recognise 
diversity. 
There are good reasons for making philosophy more inclusive. Philosophy is a necessity in 
some ways and it should be open to diverse voices. The diverse voices, on the other hand, 
are needed for philosophy. Philosophy should not turn away from the world and from 
experience, for that should be instead its central concern. The practice of the wartime quartet 
gives us an inspiring example of what such philosophy may look like. It is a philosophy of 
people who do not abandon common sense, who have conversations about a world 
common to them and in those conversation the world becomes more common and more real 
and their friendships stronger.  67
 I dedicate this article to Pamela Sue Anderson, whom I still miss very much. I like to thank audiences in  67
Uppsala, London and Durham for their comments to earlier versions. Thanks also to my colleague Yasemin J. 
Erden for her careful feedback to an earlier version and for all those years in which we worked together to 
create and maintain a very good, pluralistic philosophy programme. 
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